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SHEREE ANDERSON, his wife, 
HOPE A. HILTON, CYNTHIA 
HILTON, RALPH M. HILTON, GENE 
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FOUNDATION, 
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MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, W. SMOOT 
BRIMHALL, and JOHN DOES 1 to 
V, being former Commissioners 
of the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 19704 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants deposited substantial sums of money 
with Grove Finance Company. When the Company became 
insolvent, the appellants brought an action against the 
State of Utah and the Commissioner of the Department of 
Financial Institutions for their failure to perform 
statutory duties which would have protected the deposits. 
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Appellants1 original action was dismissed by the 
Court due to a failure to file a notice of claim with the 
State prior to commencing the action. Appellants appealed 
that dismissal on various grounds. In Madsen v. Borthick, 
658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), this Court upheld the Governmental 
Immunity Actf and found that it applied to the suit brought 
by the appellants. The Court held that because a notice of 
claim was not filed, the dismissal was proper. 658 P.2d at 
632. 
On July 20, 1983, a second complaint was filed by 
the appellants. This complaint named Mirvin D. Borthick and 
W. Smoot Brimhall, individually, as defendants. The 
complaint alleged that their actions and failure to act 
constituted gross negligence. (R 2-8.) 
The respondents were successful in obtaining a 
Summary Judgment on this second action. The grounds were 
that a) res judicata acted as a bar to the second action; 
b) that respondents are immune from suit under §63-30-1, et 
seq. , Utah Code Ann., for the same reason set out in Madsen 
v. Borthick, supra; and c) that the applicable statute of 
limitations bars the current action. (R. 89, 90., R. 35.) 
This brief sets forth the reasons why none of the 
grounds granting Summary Judgment are appropriate. 
Appellants should be allowed to continue discovery and 
prepare for trial. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court granted 
respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of 
res judicata, immunity from suit under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1, et seq. , and the 
statute of limitations. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to reverse the order granting 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case 
for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter Madsen), 
originally brought suit against the State of Utah and 
Mirvin D. Borthick, Commissioner of the Department of 
Financial Institutions on or about March 2, 1981). 
(R. 35.) 
On March 27, 1981, the State made a Motion to 
Dismiss because of Madsen's failure to file a notice of 
claim with the State prior to seeking judicial relief. 
(R. 69) 
That case was dismissed by the District Court on 
May 14, 1981. (R. 69.) 
The Supreme Court of Utah, on appeal in Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), found that the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act applied. Hence, Madsen's failure 
to file a notice of claim before commencing the action 
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barred Madsen from continuing in the action,, The dismissal 
was thus affirmed on January 28, 1983. 658 P. 2d 627 (Utah 
1983) . 
On July 20, 1983, the complaint in the current 
action was filed in the Third District Court. 
(R. 2.) 
On September 19, 1983, respondents made a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The motion was argued before 
Judge Dee of the Third District Court on November 21, 1983. 
(R. 32, 32, 86.) 
On December 8, 1983, Judge Dee signed an order 
granting defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 90.) 
It is from that final order that this appeal is taken. 
POINT I. 
THE DISMISSAL OF THE ORIGINAL 
ACTION WAS NOT ON THE MERITS 
The District Court, in granting respondents1 
Motion for Summary Judgment, held that the doctrine of res 
judicata was applicable. For this to be true, however, it 
would be necessary that the original action have been 
dismissed on the merits. A judgment on the merits is a 
mandatory prerequisite to applicability of the doctrine of 
res judicata. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 
81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551; Wilson v. Bittick, 403 P.2d 159 
(Cal. 1965). 
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Res judicata is inapplicable because the dismissal 
of the original action was not on the merits. In fact, the 
issue of the dismissal and whether it was on the merits is 
the kingpin to the majority of the other issues to be 
addressed in this appeal. 
NOT ON THE MERITS 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that: 
In order that a judgment may constitute 
a bar to another suit, it must be . . . 
determined on its merits. If the first 
suit was dismissed for defect of 
pleadings, or parties, . . . or was 
disposed of on any ground which did not 
go to the merits of the action, the 
judgment rendered will prove no bar to 
another suit. Costello v. United 
States, supra, at 286 quoting Hughes v. 
United States, 4 Wall 232, 18 L.Ed. 303. 
PROCEDURAL DEFECT 
One reason that dismissal for a procedural defect 
is not considered to be on the merits is because the actual 
merits of the claim are not considered by the court. The 
plaintiff is never permitted to reach the point where the 
court could consider plaintiff's rights and the defendant's 
LiabilvtY r^isirvg o\rt of "the claim. Tb,e defewiatvt does s,o*t 
have to incur the inconvenience of preparing to meet the 
merits because the procedural dismissal is an initial bar to 
the court's reaching them. 
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In the original action, the defendants were served 
with process on March 9, 1981 and March 12, 1981. Two weeks 
later, on March 27, 1981, before an answer was filed, the 
defendants made the Motion to Dismiss for failure to file a 
notice of claim. The District Court granted the motion on 
May 14, 1981, never reaching or considering the substantive 
portion of plaintiffs8 claim. This is also supported by the 
Court's language in the original Madsen v. Borthick: 
The dismissal of plaintiffs1 complaint 
against the State was proper on the 
basis of governmental immunity and 
noncompliance with the notice 
requirement. 658 P.2d at 632. 
In other words, since the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was 
found to apply, the notice of claim was a necessary 
requirement. Dismissal for failure to file a notice of 
claim was a dismissal for a procedural defect—not on the 
merits. 
UTAH LAW FAVORS MADSEN 
This Court in Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P. 2d 144 
(Utah 1979) , held that a dismissal of an action for the 
failure of a plaintiff to comply with notice of claim 
provisions does not constitute an adjudication on the 
merits. Such a failure merely involves a procedural defect 
unrelated to the merits of the actual claim in any way. 
Such a failure may be fatal to a suit, but it does not act 
as a bar to a subsequent suit if the defect was cured or was 
inapplicable to the second action. 
6 
It must be explained that Foil v. Ballinger, 
involved a failure to file a notice of claim in a medical 
malpractice action as opposed to an action against the 
government. The principle, however, is the same; a 
dismissal for failure to comply with a condition precedent 
is not on the merits. 
There are numerous instances in which 
the law requires fulfillment of a 
condition precedent before the filing of 
a complaint, and failure to comply with 
the condition may result in a dismissal, 
but not on the merits. Foil v. 
Ballinger, supra, at 150. 
COMPARISON OF LANGUAGE 
The medical malpractice act states: 
No malpractice action . . . may be 
initiated unless and until the plaintiff 
gives the prospective defendant . 
notice of intent to commence an 
action . . . . §78-14-8, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act states: 
Any person having a claim for injury to 
person or property against a 
governmental entity . . . shall, before 
maintaining an action under this act, 
file a written notice of claim . . . . 
§63-30-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
In comparing the two sections quoted above, it is 
apparent that even though the wording differs, the meaning 
is the same: giving notice is a condition precedent to 
initiating or maintaining an action. Hence, the rule set 
down in Foil v. Ballinger, is applicable in this case. 
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For these reasons, the original action was not 
dismissed on the merits. Res judicata is inapplicable here 
and does not operate as a bar to Madsenfs current action. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT IMMUNE 
FROM SUIT UNDER THE GOVERN-
MENTAL IMMUNITY ACT ON A 
CLAIM OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE 
A. NO IMMUNITY 
The respondents in this action are individuals 
being sued in their individual capacity only. Madsen seeks 
to establish, if allowed to proceed to trial, that the 
respondents1 actions and their failure to act constituted 
gross negligence. 
This action against individuals solely on 
allegations of gross negligence is not barred by the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Section 63-30-4, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953), as it stood at the time this action arose, states: 
(3) The remedy against a 
governmental entity or its employee for 
an injury caused by an act or omission 
which occurs during the performance of 
such employee's duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of 
authority is, after the effective date 
of this act, exclusive of any other 
civil action or proceeding by reason of 
the same subject matter against the 
employee or the estate of the employee 
whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim, unless the employee acted or 
failed to act through gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice. 
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(4) An employee may be joined in 
an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act 
or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be 
liable, but no employee shall be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to act due to 
gross negligence, fraud, or malice. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not 
apply to individuals in the same way it applies to 
governmental entities. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 
(Utah 1977), held that if no judgment is obtained against a 
governmental entity, the plaintiff may proceed against an 
employee thereof. 571 P.2d at 927. 
Madsen is definitely barred from proceeding 
against the State or the Department of Financial 
Institutions by virtue of the matters decided in Madsen v. 
Borthick, supra. However, there is no bar to proceeding 
against the employees on allegations of gross negligence. 
B. NOTICE OF CLAIM NOT REQUIRED 
Appellants do not dispute that in order for a 
potential plaintiff to proceed against the government, where 
a governmental function is involved, a notice of claim must 
first be filed. 
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A notice of claim need net be filed when an action 
is brought against government employees on allegations of 
gross negli<?encef fraud, or malice. Section 63-30-11, Utah 
Code Ann,/ a s it existed at the time this action arose, 
provided: 
Service of the notice of claim upon an 
employee of a governmental entity is not 
a condition precedent to the 
commencement of an action . . . against 
such person. If an action . . . is 
commenced against the employee, but not 
against the governmental entity, service 
of the notice of claim upon the 
governmental entity is required only if 
the entity has a statutory duty to 
indemnify such person. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Thus, the question becomes, is there a statutory duty to 
indemnify a n employee sued on allegations of gross 
negligence? The answer to this is no. 
Section 63-48-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as it 
existed at the time the action arose, stated: 
(4) No public entity is obligated 
to pay any judgment based upon a claim 
against an officer or employee if it is 
established that the officer or employee 
acted or failed to act due to gross 
negligence, fraud, or malice. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Ear tJbie&e reasons* > no service of a. aotlce of claim 
was necessary because Madsen's action is based solely on 
allegations of gross negligence. 
POINT III 
MADSEN'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED 
BY ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Madsen's claim against Mr. Borthick and 
Mr. Brimh^H w a s filed on July 20, 1983. Respondents have 
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asserted that the claim is barred by any one of three 
statutes of limitation. (R. 16f 29.) 
Due to the operation of §78-12-40
 f Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) , there is no statute of limitation problem: 
If any action is commenced within due 
time and . . . the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than on the merits, and the 
time limited either by law or contract 
for commencing the same shall have 
expired, the plaintiff . . . may 
commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The first action was commenced by filing a 
complaint with the District Court on or about March 2, 1981. 
This is in line with the method outlined in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure: 
A civil action is commenced (1) by 
filing a complaint with the court, or 
(2) by the service of a summons. Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not define any other 
method for commencement of an action. Hence, pursuant to 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the original 
action was commenced when a complaint was filed with 
the District Court in March of 1981. 
As explained in Point I, above, the dismissal of 
the original action was not on the merits. The dismissal 
was affirmed by this Court on January 28, 1983, in Madsen v. 
Borthick, supra. The current action was commenced on 
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July 20, 1983, well within the one-year period allowed by 
§78-12-40, Utah Code Ann. 
For these reasons, there is no statute of 
limitations bar to the current action. Madsen should be 
allowed to proceed in this action. 
POINT IV 
THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
ARE NOT RETROACTIVE AS TO 
THE APPELLANTS 
The 1983 Utah Legislature made various changes in 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-1, et seq. 
Certain amendments work to bring governmental employees1 
actions that amount to gross negligence within the 
protective immunity of the Act. 
Specifically, §63-30-4, Utah Code Ann., was 
amended to provide that an employee may not be held 
personally liable for acting or failing to act unless it is 
established he acted due to fraud or malice. Gross 
negligence is no longer a basis for personal liablity under 
this section. (§63-30-4, Utah Code Ann. (1983 pocket 
supplement)). 
Section 63-30-11, Utah Code Ann., was amended to 
totally remove the language exempting a claimant from filing 
a notice of claim when there is no statutory duty to 
indemnify the employee. (§63-30-11, Utah Code Ann. (1983 
pocket supplement)). 
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Chapter 48 of Title 63 was repealed, including 
§63-48-4 -which obligated the State to indemnify employees 
except when the judgment was based on gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice. (§63-48-1, et seq., (1983 pocket 
supplement)). 
These amendments cannot have retroactive effect 
with respect to Madsen. Otherwise, the cause of action 
would be totally destroyed. 
Madsen seeks to go to trial to establish gross 
negligence on the part of the respondents. Due to the 
holding in Madsen v. Borthick, supra, this is Madsen's only 
available cause of action. 
Retrospective application of these statutes would 
be more than a mere remedial change. It would eliminate a 
vested cause of action. 
This Court has repeatedly held that a statute will 
not be found to have retroactive effect if such action will 
modify vested rights or interests. See, for example, 
Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). In Pilcher, the 
Court explained that there is an exception to this rule: 
A contrary rule applies, however, where 
a statute changes only procedural law by 
providing a different mode or form of 
procedure for enforcing substantive 
rights. Such remedial statutes are 
generally applied retrospectively to 
accrued or pending actions to further 
the Legislature's purpose. 663 P.2d at 
455. 
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This "contrary rule" is not applicable here; the 
amendments by the Legislature do much more than provide a 
different procedure for enforcing substantive rights. 
Rather, a common law cause of action against government 
employees for gross negligence has been removed by the 
legislature. This is the only cause of action remaining to 
Madsen. To remove it by retroactive application of an 
amendment would destroy a right. Such would be wrong. 
Madsen should be allowed to proceed in this action. The 
Summary Judgment should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the brief, facts, and relevant law 
compels the conclusion that Summary Judgment was 
inappropriate. The case should be remanded for trial 
because: 
1. The dismissal of the original action was not 
on the merits; 
2. The respondents are not immune from suit 
through the Governmental Immunity Act; 
3. It was not necessary to file a notice of 
claim with respect to this action against the respondents; 
4. This action comes under §78-12-40, Utah Code 
Ann. , and is thus not barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations; and 
5. The 1983 amendments to the Governmental 
Immunity Act may not be applied retroactively on this 
action. 
14 
To reverse and remand will simply allow Madsen to 
continue discovery and trial preparations. Madsen should be 
allowed to have his day in Court to attempt to establish 
gross negligence on the part of the respondents. 
Respectfully submitted this Jg day of March, 
1984. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants 
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